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ARGUMENTS

THE COURT'S JURISDICTION WAS INVOKED UPON
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.
The Department contends that Mr. Yardley failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court by failing to name the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in his petition for
judicial review and his subsequent brief. Mr. Yardley has previously argued in his
response to the Department's motion for summary disposition that he properly named the
agency in his petition for judicial review as required by Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA). UAPA contains statutory definitions for the material terms that it uses.
Pursuant to and consistent with those definitions, Mr. Yardley named the proper agency
in his timely filed petition for judicial review. Seef Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-2 and 6346b-14. Furthermore, since Mr. Yardley's previous response, the Utah Supreme Court
has directly addressed the issue raised by the Department and ruled in a manner that
resolves the issue in favor of Mr. Yardley.
In Harley Davidson v. Workforce Services, 116 P.3d 349 (Utah 2005), the
Supreme Court, in a decision filed June 21,2005, addressed the issue of appellate court
jurisdiction over administrative rulings. The Court's ruling was simple and clear: "[w]e
hold that regardless of whether a party seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate
court under rule 3 or rule 14, the only jurisdictional requirement is the timely filing of the
pleading initiating appellate review." Id. at 352. (Emphasis added). In so ruling, the
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Court rejected the respondent's arguments that a wrongly titled petition, a petition not
filed with the required filing fee, not served on the opposing party and a petition that had
the incorrect court designation were jurisdictional defects.
In an effort to distinguish Harley Davidson from applying to this case, the
Department contends that factual distinctions between this case and Harley Davidson
make it inapplicable to this case. The Department, citing to paragraph 5 of the opinion,
asserts that in Harley Davidson all the deficiencies in the petition were corrected well
before the briefing stage, unlike the facts in the present case. Resp. Brf. at 14. There were
a number of defects with the petition in Harley Davidson spanning from failing to pay the
filing fee to failing to serve the opposing party. Id, Contrary to the Department's
statement, paragraph 5 of the opinion reflects only that the filing fee was paid and the
name of the pleading was corrected. Id. at 351. Moreover, the Court's ruling in Harley
Davidson was not fact sensitive or narrowly tailored to the facts of the case. Indeed, the
Court specifically stated that it declined to adopt a "narrow application" of the ruling. Id.
at 352. Thus, the Department's efforts to persuade this Court that Harley Davidson does
not apply to this case because of factual distinctions are without merit.
Mr. Yardley timely filed his petition for review. In doing so, Mr. Yardley properly
invoked the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Harley Davidson v. Workforce Services, 116 P.3d 349
(Utah 2005). The remaining arguments advanced by the Department regarding the need

2

to name the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in the petition for this Court to
exercise jurisdiction over the CSRB decision that is the subject of this appeal were
explicitly and implicitly rejected by the Harley Davidson Court when they stated "we, like
the court of appeal, can find no principled reason to treat agency petitions differently that
other appeals/' Id. at 352. Thus, contrary to the Department's argument, there was no
need to for the Court in Harley Davidson to discuss the differences between an agency
appeal and an appeal from a lower court because the Court found no "principled reason"
to do so.

MR. YARDLEY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS GO
BEYOND RECEIVING NOTICE OF THE ALLEGATIONS
AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
The Department responds to Mr. Yardley's argument that he was denied due
process when the Department failed to utilize committee reviews and conduct a
meaningful investigation by contending that all that was required was notice of the
allegations and an opportunity to be heard and that Mr. Yardley's argument creates an
additional due process requirement not supported by authority. The Department's
contention is in error.
When a public employee has an expectation to continued employment, they enjoy a
property right in that employment that cannot be adversely affected by the public
employer without first affording the employee due process. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. V.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep % 616 P.2d 598,
3

601 (Utah 1980), As previously described by the Utah Supreme Court, "[d]ue process is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance;
it is flexible and requires such procedural protections as the particular situation demand."
Worrallv. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616P.2d598, 602 (Utah 1980). Ultimately, "[t]he
purpose of due process is to prevent fundamental unfairness." Kent v. Department of
Employment, 860 P.2d 984, 987, nt. 4 (Utah App. 1993)(Citing State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d
1319,1325 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, contrary to the Department's implied contention,
due process protections in the discipline or discharge of a public employee are not limited
to notice of the allegations and opportunity to be heard.
As Mr. Yardley recited in his opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court has
specifically addressed the issues raised by Mr. Yardley regarding the Department's failure
to use committee reviews and conduct an investigation. Adopting a holding from a
Washington Supreme Court decision, the Court held that when a public employer
announces a particular policy or practice, the employer must follow the particular policy
or practice. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992). The Court's
holding is nothing more than requiring the employer to act with fundamental fairness by
following the policies and practices it announces to its employees consistent with due
process principles. The essence of the ruling in Thurston is also grounded in statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-16(4)(h)(iii) provides that upon judicial review of a final
agency action following an adjudicative proceeding, the appellate court may only grant
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relief where the party seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by an agency's
failure to act consistent with a prior practice. Accordingly, authority exists specifically
supporting Mr. Yardley's position that the Department is required to act consistent with
prior practices utilized in the discharge of an employee.
In Mr. Yardley's case, the evidence developed at the evidentiary hearing
demonstrated without dispute that the Department had a practice of using committee
reviews in the process of disciplining employees and that it failed to use committee
reviews in discharging Mr. Yardley. Likewise, the evidence also demonstrated that the
Department, as a matter of established policy and practice, conducts an investigation as
part of their disciplinary process which also was not followed in Mr. Yardley's case.
(Addendum A). By failing to follow its own policy and practices in discharging Mr.
Yardley, the Department acted fundamentally unfair and thereby violated Mr. Yardley's
due process rights.

THE WARNING APPLIES TO MR. YARDLEY'S
DISCHARGE BY ITS PLAIN TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION.
The Department responds to Mr. Yardley's argument that his discharge was in
violation of the warning it previously issued him by contending that the warning was not
applicable to the discharge for two reasons. First, the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was
discharged was not of the "type" for which he was previously disciplined. Secondly, the
warning only applied to future misconduct. The Department's response is without merit.

5

The Department's argument that the warning's use of the word "type" limited its
application to a degree that it did not apply to Mr. Yardley's discharge because the
conduct for which he was discharged was more egregious than the conduct for which he
was previously disciplined, is simply an effort to rewrite the warning after its already
been given effect. Considering that the Department previously disciplined Mr. Yardley
for sexual acts committed alone and with his wife recorded on video tape and then issued
a warning that he would be terminated should he engage in that "type" of behavior in the
future, the reasonable and plain interpretation of the warning would make it applicable to
sexual conduct committed alone or with his wife. The fact that the masturbation may
have been committed in a different manner does not change the "type" of the conduct.
The application of the warning, however, is not without limitation. The application of the
warning is limited to the type of conduct for which Mr. Yardley was disciplined.
Certainly inappropriate acts unrelated to the conduct would not be covered just as other
sexual acts unrelated to acts of masturbation would not be covered. To contend that the
warning would amount to "carte blanche " as the Department argues is an unreasonable
embellishment of the warning.
Perhaps the best illustration of the weakness of the Department's argument is the
answer to the following question: would the Department rely on the warning to justify
Mr. Yardley's discharge if Mr. Yardley committed the acts for which he was discharged
after warning? Absolutely. The similarity of the conduct, how it was recorded would all
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support that Mr. Yardley was previously warned thereby meriting his discharge. If the
Department is entitled to rely upon the warning certainly Mr. Yardley is equally entitled
as a matter of fundamental fairness. The enforcement of the warning is not and should
not be dependent upon the discretion and preference of the Department, but rather upon
its own terms and pursuant to law.
The Department's further contention that Mr. Yardley's argument is unreasonable
because it fails to realize that the warning only applies to future conduct not only
overlooks the overall construction and language of the warning, but ironically is an
argument in support of Mr. Yardley's position.
The warning is constructed with the following language: "should this type of
misconduct reoccur in the future..." In using the word reoccur, the interpretation of the
warning that is communicated is that the matter is now closed, but if the conduct should
reoccur, termination would be likely. To contend that by its reference to future, the
warning has no contemplation to conduct that has already occurred is contrary to the
wording of the warning.
The essence of the Department's argument is that because the conduct for which
Mr. Yardley was discharged occurred before the warning and not after the warning, the
warning does not apply. In short, if Mr. Yardley committed the conduct after the warning
and not before, then the warning applies - and would serve as a basis to terminate. As a
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matter of fundamental fairness, the opposite must also be true - if Mr. Yardley did not
commit the conduct after the warning, then he should not have been terminated.
Furthermore, the warning was in an administrative complaint that Mr. Yardley did
not appeal thereby resulting in its inclusion into the final order by reference. As a final
order, Mr. Yardley would reasonably believe the matter was closed with the only
remaining concern that he take the warning seriously and not repeat the misconduct lest
his employment would be terminated. That belief is also consistent with Mr. Yardley's
required participation in the "performance plan" as a result of his prior discipline where
the intent of the plan was to bring closure to the matter. (RT.302:34-35).

CONCLUSION
The issue as to whether Mr. Yardley properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction has
been resolved. Mr. Yardley invoked this Court's jurisdiction when he timely filed his
petition for judicial review.
By failing to follow its practice and policy of utilizing committee reviews and
conducting an investigation in Mr. Yardley's case, the Department violated his due
process rights in their discharge of his employment. Furthermore, the Department's
discharge of Mr. Yardley's employment violated the terms of the warning they previously
issued him. Because the warning was an enforceable component of the Department's
employment relationship with Mr. Yardley his discharge was improper. Accordingly, the
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CSRB's decision upholding the Department's discharge of Mr. Yardley's employment
was not rational nor reasonable.
Because Mr. Yardley was improperly discharged, the decision of the CSRB
upholding his discharge should be set aside and reversed and Mr. Yardley should be
reinstated to his employment with the Department and awarded all appropriate back pay
and other wages or compensation as provided by law from the dat/of his discharge.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2 2 n ^ ^ o f / e p t e m b e r i o 0 5 .

x&7\. iN^kamura /
fhsel for Petitioner
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Addendum A

imposition of discipline as other career service members.
1.
If a mediation or due process hearing is granted by the Department,
there shall be no right of appeal beyond the Executive Director.
2.
The decision to grant a mediation or hearing to a probationary or
exempt member lies within the discretion of the Executive Director/designee.
C.
Probationary or exempt status members may be terminated only with the
prior approval of the Executive Director.
D.
The Executive Director/designee shall provide written notification to the
employee specifying the reasons for the dismissal or demotion and the effective
date.
AE 03/02.08 Procedure: Supervisory and Administrative Staff
A.
Supervisory and administrative staff are held to higher standards than
non-managerial members.
B.
Greater sanctions may be imposed on supervisory and administrative staff
than on non-managerial members.
AE 03/02,09 Procedure: Certified Peace Officers and Correctional Officers
A.
Certified officers hold a high level of public trust and shall be held to
higher standards of conduct than civilian members.
B.

Greater sanctions may be imposed on certified officers.

C.

Conduct affecting officer certification shall be referred to POST.

D.
Decertification or suspension of any Peace Officer or Correctional
Officer by POST may result in termination of the member's employment with the
Department.
AE 03/03.00 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN MEMBER DISCIPLINE
AE 03/03.01 Policy
It is the policy of the Department that:
A.
each division shall perform the investigative functions in all suspected
and/or reported infractions except:
1.

sexual harassment;

2.

discrimination;

3.
conduct in violation of federal or State law, or municipal
ordinance, excluding minor traffic violations;
Revised 12/1/93

AA 01/01.00

4.

firearms violations;

5.

inappropriate use of alcohol and substance abuse;

6.

use of excessive force; or

7.
other violations which, on a case-by- case basis, the Deputy
Director may assign to OPSE.
B.
in cases where one or more of the above is alleged, the division director^
shall promptly refer the matter to the Deputy Director or the Department
~/
Representative;
y ^
C.
in allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination, the Human
Resource Director shall be promptly informed so that appropriate advice can be
expediently provided in dealing with the situation pending the outcome of any
investigation;
D.
failure to promptly report any of the above violations shall be grounds for
disciplinary action;
E.
in cases that involve the Executive Director's office, the Deputy Director
shall function as a division director;
F.
in cases where a certified officer's conduct appears to have violated the
provisions detailed in Utah Administrative Code R728- 409-3, "Cause to Evaluate
Certification for the Refusal, Suspension or Revocation of Peace Officer
Certification or Authority" the case shall also be referred to POST; and
G.
the Executive Director/designee may place the member on leave in
accordance with 67-19-18(4).
AE 03/03.02 Rationale
It is necessary for the Department to provide for those infractions which may be
investigated by each division and those that must be reported to a Deputy Director
of the Department for investigation.
AE 03/03.03 Procedure: Letters of Warning and Reprimand
A.
Letters of Warning and Reprimand should be used by managers and
supervisors to formally censure a member and shall specify the reasons for the
discipline, previous oral warnings and/or discussions and an admonition that
behavioral change by the member is necessary to avoid more serious disciplinary
action in the future. The written warning and reprimand are the only forms of
disciplinary actions that do not go through the Executive Director/designee.
1.
A written warning is a written formal communication from a
member's supervisor to the member warning the member about a problem or
violation.
2.
Revised 12/1/93

It is not grievable beyond Step 4.

AA 01/01.00

